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Abstract 
The paper’s main objective is to analyze the collective bargaining response in terms of internal 
flexibility during the Great Recession (GR) in five EU countries (Spain, Germany, France, Italy, 
United Kingdom), and three economic sectors (industry, commerce and hospitality, and financial 
services and real estate), at the establishment level (ECS2013 database). The theoretical 
framework used is linked to the varieties of unionism and to the debate on the tendency towards 
the international homogenization or heterogenization of collective bargaining between the 
European Union countries. Using a descriptive statistical analysis and a probit model, this paper 
presents new evidences. However, the responses were heterogeneous between countries and 
sectors, the use of internal functional flexibility has been more intense than the numerical and 
salary internal flexibility. Moreover, it is related to the intensity of GR. These results, in general, 
while requiring a more detailed analysis of the effects of the GR on internal flexibility in the EU 
countries, contribute to introducing a new perspective in the socioeconomic literature about the 
collective bargaining and internal flexibility.  
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1 Introduction 
There is a consensus in the socioeconomics literature that the Great Recession (GR) has intro-
duced heterogeneous transformations on the industrial relations over the European Union (EU) 
countries, although has not changed the long-term tendency of decentralization, declining union 
density and reducing union wage bargaining power. These heterogeneous effects are related to 
the sources of trade union power, which could be associated to structural power (unemployment 
rate), organizational power (union density), institutional power (collective bargaining coverage) 
and social power (capability to move and mobilized the society). In other words, on the 
particular varieties of unionisms and the welfare state in which they are developed (Frege and 
Kelly, 2004; Lehndorff et al 2017; Visser, 2016; Gumbrell-McCormick and Hyman, 2013).  
This general perspective, however, opens a window for a more disaggregated analysis, at 
sectoral and company level to evaluate the effects of GR (with a microscopic view, using a 
Gumbrell-McCormick and Hyman (2013) terminology). A company-level analysis allows a 
more accurate evaluation of the GR effects over the industrial relations. To do that, this paper 
focuses on the GR effects over the collective bargaining in the EU countries through the internal 
flexibility. 
The relationship between internal flexibility and collective bargaining is one of the most 
important issues in the recent industrial relations transformations in the EU countries. The main 
responses in the EU countries at national level were the increase of short-time work and/or 
temporary layoff; changes in working time arrangements; prevention or mitigation of job loss; 
measures to support redundant workers; employee concessions (no wage increase or reduction, 
flexible working time, other changes in working conditions); and some types of employment 
guarantees (Glassner et al., 2011; Glassner and Keune, 2010; and Carley and Marginson, 2011).  
Related to the determinants of those responses, Glassner et al. (2011) and Carley and 
Marginson (2011) argue that the intensity of the crisis did not affect the cross-country incidence 
of crisis-response agreements, particularly because measures related to short-time work and/or 
temporary lay-offs are instruments that existed in many countries before the crisis (such as 
Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy and the Netherlands). Therefore, they have not been 
developed during the crisis. The main change has been observed in the participation of the 
governments, which have extended the criteria to access to short-time working and part-time 
unemployment benefits and expanded the duration of the measures. This paper aims to 
contribute to this debate presenting new evidence at the establishment level, which allows 
measuring the type and the intensity of the responses in terms of internal flexibility and its 
relation to the economic situation. 
Specifically, the paper’s main objective is to analyze the collective bargaining response to 
the GR in terms of internal flexibility during the economic crisis in five EU countries (Spain, 
Germany, France, Italy, United Kingdom (UK)),1 and three economic sectors (industry; 
_________________________ 
1 Following the Gumbrell-McCormick and Hyman (2013) classification, we choose one country classified as central 
(Germany), three south countries (France, Italy and Spain) and UK as member of liberal market economy (LME). 
The sectoral election relates to the diverse collective bargaining structure, as we will explain in details in the 
following section. That choice was done in order to cover the diversity of different European industrial relations 
tradition, as explained by the theory of Variety of Capitalism (VoC) of Hall and Soskice (2001) and updated by 
Gumbrell-McCormick and Hyman (2013). In addition, and this is the main reason for the election, these five 
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tourism, commerce and hospitality; and bank-financial services and real estate).2 We specifi-
cally identify the main responses in terms of both existing internal flexibility instruments and 
the development of new ones through collective bargaining. These responses are classified by 
sector and country, highlighting similarities and differences, and testing whether the 
transformations in internal flexibility were the result of some characteristics of the economic 
sectors or of a particular structure of collective bargaining. We also estimate the role of other 
factors, such as how the crisis played out in different economic sectors (employment, pro-
duction, finances); the collective bargaining level in each company; the firm/establishment size; 
the productive changes in terms of productive reorganization; or the incorporation of new 
technologies. 
For the empirical analysis, we used the database of the European Company Survey 2013 
(ECS2013). This survey involved a questionnaire that sought information about how labor is 
organized inside the company in all EU countries and how these different ways are managed 
and bargaining at the establishment level. Furthermore, in terms of the objective of this paper, 
this database allows us to obtain information about the changes occurred since 2010, in internal 
flexibility, production, employment, and adoption of new methods of organizing production and 
technologies, by sector and size of the establishment. The methodological analysis uses two 
empirical methods. First, we discuss some descriptive statistics, in order to establish relations 
among the target variables. Second, an econometric analysis (probit model) is undertaken, in 
order to estimate the main factors related to internal flexibility. 
After this introduction, the following section summarizes the referenced theoretical 
framework. The third section highlights the database and methodology. To conclude, we discuss 
the main insights. 
2 Analytical and theoretical framework 
The collective bargaining responses to the economic situation could be related to a number of 
economic, institutional, structural, and technological factors, as well as to the nature of 
collective bargaining. Synthesizing this complex network of relationships and factors in a 
theoretical and conceptual analytical framework is a difficult task. Several authors, however, 
have made outstanding and substantial contributions, among them Freyssinet and Seifert (2001) 
and Sisson and Martín Artiles (2000), who developed the “Pact for Employment and 
Competitiveness" (PEC). Frege and Kelly (2004), inspired in Hall and Soskice (2001), 
developed the variety of unionism framework to show that union strategies are shaped by 
national industrial relations institutions, as well as by the interactions between union, employer 
and state strategies. Related to that, Glassner et al. (2011) and Glassner and Keune (2010) 
_________________________ 
countries are the biggest European countries, in terms of GDP, employment and industrial complexity. According to 
Eurostat, in 2013, year of the used database in this paper - ECS2013, Germany, Spain, France, Greece, Italy and the 
United Kingdom, weighted up to 77 percent of the EU15 GDP and above 78 percent of the total EU15 employment. 
2 In order to simplify, to refer to these three sectors will be used, respectively, industry, tourism and bank. 
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established an analytical framework for interpreting collective-bargaining responses to the crisis 
in the EU. 
Following Sisson and Martín Artiles (2000), the nature of collective bargaining can be 
classified by the results of two different negotiation processes: distributive bargaining, where 
there are winners and losers in a zero-sum game; or integrative bargaining, in which both parts 
of the negotiation seek to integrate their objectives in a positive-sum game, thus benefitting both 
parts. These two categories of collective bargaining are not static, and there is a wide-ranging 
debate in the literature about their dynamics, and about the role played by public policy and the 
company management. 
Another question refers to the meaning of collective bargaining in periods of productive 
transformation. The main interpretation emphasizes that the PECs assume that concessions will 
be made by workers (concession bargaining). Sisson and Martín Artiles (2000) feel that in 
PECs, a concession bargaining scheme, such as “give-and-take” or “win-win,” might be 
considered, in which workers would accept more internal flexibility in exchange for job 
stability. Nevertheless, other authors, such as Mitchell (1994), consider that concession 
bargaining does not solely imply concessions by workers, because it also involves a change in 
equilibrium in employment relations that favors employers, with little or no quid pro quos on 
their part. 
A study from Glassner et al. (2011) complements this analytical framework. They highlight 
three different aspects that characterize collective bargaining responses to the economic crisis. 
First, the different measures adopted in the search for protection during the crisis, understanding 
protection to mean a guarantee of employment and income for workers. For companies, this 
means ensuring their survival, maintaining market shares, and retaining the most skilled and 
experienced workers (the response depends on the economic sector since substitution rates are 
not the same in all sectors). Collective bargaining would be the opportunity for both parties to 
dialogue and come to an agreement on these matters.  
Second, this analytical framework considers the balance between protection measures (from 
a long-term perspective, maintaining jobs and skilled workers) in contrast to the need to reduce 
costs (lowering or freezing wages, flexibility, and eliminating jobs). In this sense, the analytical 
framework of Walton and McKersie (1965) highlights the idea of integrative and distributive 
collective bargaining. Then, if lower costs predominate, distributive bargaining prevails; or 
when protection against uncertainty predominates, then integrative negotiation prevails. 
The third aspect related to procedural innovation in collective bargaining involves changes 
in the legal framework that regulates the way collective bargaining is carried out, the aspects of 
the labor relationship that can be regulated, which eventually may end up destabilizing the 
equilibrium between distributive and integrative factors in the negotiations. Examples of these 
factors include the ultra-activity of collective-bargaining agreements, the way in which wages 
are negotiated, whether company agreements have preference over sector agreements, and more. 
Despite substantive changes in some EU countries because of the GR, the authors emphasize 
that procedural innovation is more likely to be incremental and to follow trends already in place. 
In this analytical framework, there is also a synthetic structure designed by Glassner et al. 
(2011) and Glassner and Keune (2010), in the same perspective of the main determinants of 
trade union power, inspired in the literature about VoC (Lehndorff et al 2017; Gumbrell-
McCormick and Hyman, 2013). These authors highlight the role played by four factors on labor 
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relations. These are labor market institutions, public policies, trade union and company strate-
gies, and the economic situation at the national, sectoral, or company level. Together they 
provide a synthetic and appropriate framework for analyzing the effects of the GR on collective 
bargaining. After some adaptations, this framework is the reference to the econometric model in 
this article.  
3 The national and sectoral context 
As we highlight at the beginning of this paper, at the national level the GR has introduced 
heterogeneous transformations on the industrial relations over the EU countries, although do not 
change the long-term tendency of decentralization, declining the union density and reducing the 
union wage bargaining power (Lehndorff et al 2017; Visser, 2016; Gumbrell-McCormick and 
Hyman, 2013).3 
In the five countries analyzed here, these studies show that the crisis has influenced 
particularly in the European southern countries (especially in Spain and Italy), deepening that 
long-term trend, due to a relatively greater reduction of the organizational structural power. 
Nevertheless, in France and Italy, the unions maintained their capacity of mass mobilization and 
were able to put on public arena their labor demands; but not in Spain, where the unions have 
lost much of their social support. Despite this, the coverage rate in these three countries remains 
among the highest in the EU. On the other hand, in the UK and Germany, the GR has not 
changed the long-term tendency to reduce the union power (lower density and coverage, and 
greater collective bargaining fragmentation) observed since the 1980s. However, this reduction 
has been more adverse in Germany than in the UK, where the union membership and coverage 
rate have been reducing faster than in the UK and the EU average.4 
This heterogeneity is also observed in the structure of collective bargaining and in the 
union's power at the sectoral level, as shown in Table 1. 
  
_________________________ 
3 “The Great Recession has sharpened the divide between a smaller group of countries with more cohesive and 
coordinated industrial relations and wage bargaining institutions, and lower inequality levels, and a larger group of 
countries where ‘markets make policies’, wage bargaining institutions are divisive and uncoordinated, and income 
inequality levels are higher” Visser (2016). According to Gumbrell-McCormick and Hyman (2013), among other 
authors, and following the perspective of VoC or Varieties of Unionism, Lehndorff et al 2017 point out four main 
conclusions from the effects of GR in Collective Bargaining: “i. Density varies remarkably across countries; ii. 
Density has declined universally in the past three decades, but far more severely in some countries than others. 
Consequently, disparities have increased over time. In general, unions where membership level was initially high, 
have proved more resilient; iii. There are clear differences in bargaining coverage, but they are not to dramatic; iv. In 
some countries the coverage level has fallen far less than union density, and indeed in some countries is still higher 
today than thirty years ago”. 
4 Visser Data Base. 
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Table 1. Collective Bargaining predominant at sectoral level and coverage rate (%). Bank, Industry, and 
Tourism. Spain, Germany, France, Italy, and the UK.  
Sector Spain Germany France Italy UK 
Bank (2011) Sector/ 
National 
(95-100%) 
Sector/ 
National 
(88% West; 
64% East) 
Sector/ 
National 
(95-100%) 
Sector/ 
National 
(95-100%) 
Company 
(20%) 
Industry1 
(2010) 
Sector/ 
Regional 
(100%) 
Sector/ 
Regional 
(65%) 
Sector/ 
National 
(95%) 
Sector/ 
National 
(100%) 
Company 
(60%) 
Tourism2 (2012) Sector/ 
Regional 
(100%) 
Sector/ 
Regional 
(48% West; 
25% East) 
Sector/ 
National 
(100%) 
Sector/ 
National 
(100%) 
Company/ 
Establishment 
(5%) 
OBS: Coverage rate of Hospitality, data from 2012; banking data from 2011; and metal data from 2011.  
OBS: 1. Metal sector; 2. HORECA sector: hotel, restaurant, and cafes. 
Source: EurWORK: https://www.eurofound.europa.eu/observatories/eurwork/representativeness-studies 
According to EurWORK5, in Spain, France and Italy between 95% and 100% of the 
workers in these three sectors were covered by a collective agreement (the collective agreement 
is extended to no affiliated workers or companies). In Germany, the coverage rate is higher in 
the East than in West. In France and Germany, every company and employer organization can 
negotiate in their own sub-sector on several issues (including wages and working time). 
The collective bargaining predominant sectoral level does not change during the GR in all 
countries. However, in a microscopic analysis, it is possible to observe important procedural 
innovations in the Spanish and Italian sectoral collective agreement. The productive transfor-
mation associated to the GR, the high reduction of employment and GDP, and the reduction of 
trade union social support, created a suitable context to concession bargaining scheme that 
implied both concessions by workers in terms of internal flexibility and changes in the industrial 
relations equilibrium in favor of employers. This process, which is also a general trend in the 
EU, is resulting in a disorganized decentralization in these countries because of the absence of a 
social pact. 
One characteristic of the trade union structure in the three south European countries is the 
existence of trade union competition in each sector. In spite of this, during the GR in France and 
Spain, the big unions have coordinated the bargaining process. It is not the case in Italy. 
Collective bargaining in Italy takes place at two levels: at a national sectoral level, reflecting 
general wages and working conditions, and, at a second level, agreements are negotiated at the 
company level. In 2009, once the crisis began, a new Framework Agreement that introduced 
changes in the structure of the agreements was presented but not signed by all unions, because it 
altered the balance between the two levels of bargaining and divided the unions (CGIL- 
Confederazione Generale Italiana del Lavoro, did not sign this agreement). 
_________________________ 
5 European Observatory of Working Life,  
   https://www.eurofound.europa.eu/observatories/eurwork/representativeness-studies  
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This labor reform introduced changes in favor of a company collective agreement since it 
supposedly allows internal flexibility to adapt more quickly and effectively than in the case of 
sectoral/national agreements.6 In this inter-union conflict, the rupture that marked the 
Pomigliano Agreement,7 transformed into a specific collective agreement for a FIAT 
production plant, also stands out. 
In Spain, the union bargaining power during the GR reduced significantly,8 although there 
is a difference between sectors. Sectors formed by large companies, such as industrial, banking 
and public services, relatively maintained their bargaining power, allowing them to negotiate 
internal flexibility instead of external flexibility. In the other sectors, its power has significantly 
decreased cause the lack of structural, organizational and social power. Moreover, the 
institutional power was severely damaged since the 2012 labor reform that promoted 
decentralization (prioritizing firm agreement face to upper level) and the end of ultra-activity 
clauses.9  
4 Database and methodology of analysis 
The analysis used microdata from the European Company Survey 2013 (ECS2013), conducted 
in 2013 to establishments with more than 10 workers in all economic sectors, except agriculture, 
household activities, and organizations with extraterritorial activities (NGOs or similar). The 
survey includes variables such as work organization, working time, and the pay system, which 
allow us to measure internal functional flexibility (IFF), internal numerical flexibility (INF), and 
salary or financial flexibility (SF), as defined by Atkinson (1984).  
Three indicators measure the degree of IFF. First, it considers the existence of work teams 
with certain functions, although their internal mechanisms are, in general, autonomous. Second, 
it accounts for workers who carry out their activities in more than one work team and, finally, it 
includes functional flexibility, in other words, if workers can carry out more than one task. The 
ECS2013 indicates that multitasking or task rotation occurs when a worker moves between two 
or more tasks.  
_________________________ 
6 For example, the Accordo interconfederale in materia di rappresentanza, signed on June 28th of 2011 between 
Confindustria (employer’s representativeness) and the three main unions (CGIL, CISL and UIL), gave prominence to 
company agreements (LABREF Database). 
7 Pomigliano is the name of a factory, located near of Naples, for which an agreement was reached between the FIAT 
company and two of the three main unions in the sector (FIOM-CGIL was left out). This agreement, after leaving 
FIAT from the sectoral employers' association, meant a break in the sectoral labor relations with consequences in 
others sectoral collective bargaining. 
8 Because of the high growth of unemployment rate, the structural power has reduced significantly during the GR 
(high unemployment rate - 24% in 2012 and almost 5 million unemployed people). 
9 Despite this, sectoral collective bargaining has been able to maintain its importance, the sectoral coverage rate 
remains higher than the company coverage rate and has even increased between 2008 and 2016, from 90% to 93% of 
total employees in Spain (Source: Ministerio de Empleo y Seguridad Social de España: Encuesta Annual Laboral –
Annual Labour Survey – http://www.mitramiss.gob.es/estadisticas/EAL/welcome.htm). 
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INF refers to the organization of working time within establishments to meet the needs of 
both employees and employers and is measured in ECS2013 with three indicators: 
Flexible working hours: the possibility of workers adapting to changes at the start or the end 
of the working day (flextime); 
Bank hours: the possibility of saving working time and using it later;  
Part-time: the percentage of part-time workers. 
SF refers to the variable share of worker payments, i.e., a supplement to the basic wage that 
varies both in amount and over time, that is, it is not fixed. It is defined by a series of elements 
normally associated with the productive and financial performance of the company and its 
workers. ECS2013 shows five different forms of wage flexibility, three associated with the 
productive performance of workers and the establishment, and two associated with the financial 
performance of the establishment or company. The flexible wage:   
Depends on the performance of the establishment. 
Depends on individual performance. 
Is associated with the performance of the work team or department. 
Depends on the profit-sharing scheme. 
Depends on workers’ participation in the capital of the company (shares). 
ECS2013 has a variable that allows us to evaluate the percentage of establishments that have 
introduced changes in all three indicators of internal flexibility since 2010, by country, sectors 
of activity, size, etc. 
In order to achieve the objective of this study, our analysis will focus on the changes made 
in workforce organization and allocation (a proxy for IFF), the changes in working time (a 
proxy for INF), and the changes in remuneration systems (a proxy for SF). 
Further, we shall attempt to relate the changes observed in each indicator, representative of 
the different types of flexibility, to economic situation variables, i.e., changes in employment, 
production, and finances; the incorporation of technology; and changes in the wage bargaining 
level. The empirical study has a descriptive statistical analysis and an estimation of the main 
determinants of the changes in the three types of internal flexibility at the establishment level in 
the five countries using a probit model. Following the synthetic structure designed by Glassner 
et al. (2011) and Glassner and Keune (2010), the explanatory variables will represent the labor 
market institutions (wage-bargaining level), the economic situation at the company level, and 
three variables: the company size, the sector, and the introduction of new technology. 
By estimating a probability model, we can define, for example, the marginal effect of 
factors such as company size or wage-negotiation level on the change in internal flexibility. To 
do this, the main purpose of the model is to estimate the probability of creating any type of 
change in one of the three types of internal flexibility, controlled by a series of sectoral 
variables, the establishment size, the economic situation, technology and wage-bargaining level, 
expressed in the following equation:  
𝑃�𝑌𝑖𝑖 = 𝑗� = 𝑓(𝛽𝑘𝑋𝑖 , … , 𝜀𝑖)               (1) 
where: 
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• Yij assumes the value 1 when establishment i has introduced a change in the internal flexi-
bility of type j;  
• Xi represents the explanatory variables which are: 
 Yij assumes the value 1 when establishment i has introduced a change in the internal flexibility 
of type j;  
 Xi represents the explanatory variables which are: 
 Wage-bargaining level, which can be at the occupation level (reference), establishment 
(necoempresa), sectoral/regional (necosector) and national (neconational). 
 Economic situation variables. Of the three possible economic-situation variables, i.e., 
employment, production, and finances, we decided to use only employment because of its 
greater effect on labor relations and the existence of multicollinearity with the other two 
variables. The employment variable has three dimensions: increase, decrease, and stability. 
 Establishment size: small (from 10 to 49 workers); medium (50 to 249 workers); and large 
(more than 250 workers); 
 Sectoral variables: Industry, construction, commerce and hospitality, transport and 
communication, financial services, and other services; 
 Technology, reflecting whether the establishment has introduced changes in the use of 
technology; and 
 A country dummy for each of the EU15. 
The 𝛽𝑘 coefficients represent the effects of the selected variables and the term 𝜀 represents 
the random error.  
We estimated six probit models, one for the EU15 and five for each of the countries 
considered in the study. In addition, we observed a high degree of multicollinearity between 
changes in the use of technology since 2010 and the establishment size, because that these 
variables are used alternatively in each model. Therefore, this involves six estimates for each of 
the models (two for each type of internal flexibility). 
An initial cross-correlation analysis of the three types of internal flexibility shows (Annex 2) 
a low coefficient of correlation between them, which means some independence between them. 
It also means that there could be different determinants for each type of change in internal 
flexibility and, thus, the suitability of carrying out the estimation of separate models. 
5 Main results 
5.1 Internal functional flexibility (IFF) 
Our analysis of descriptive statistics shows that Spain has undertaken more changes in IFF, 
followed by Italy, France, UK, and Germany. Medium and large establishments undertook the 
most changes. In terms of the economic sectors, the outcomes are heterogeneous, since in 
Germany the most frequent changes occurred in the industrial sector, in Spain and France they 
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occurred in commerce and hospitality, and in Italy and the UK, they occurred in the financial 
services and the real estate. 
Types of IFF also observe these heterogeneity answers. A significant percentage of estab-
lishments in Italy employs workers who are engaged in more than one task involving teamwork, 
while all five countries have a larger percentage of establishments in which most workers are 
multi-task and belong to a work team. However, when we analyze the IFF indicator, Spain and 
Italy are the countries that have introduced more changes since 2010. These results are related to 
the initial level of functional flexibility in each country and sector. (Table 2). 
The relationship between changes in IFF and the economic situation, the introduction of 
new technologies and the bargaining level, by country and sector, are homogeneous. Never-
theless, these outcomes occur with different intensity: there is a direct relationship between 
changes in IFF and the introduction of new technologies, the production of goods and services 
and the employment level, but there is no apparent relation with the wage-bargaining level. 
For all countries and sectors, the deeper the economic crisis, in terms of production and 
employment at the establishment level, the higher the changes in IFF since the beginning of 
2010. This is a new finding since the existing evidence does not find a relationship between the 
GR and the response of collective bargaining (Glassner et al., 2011; and Carley and Marginson, 
2011). 
We also observe a direct relationship between IFF change and the introduction of new 
technology (Annex 3). There is a debate in the economic literature on the direction of causality, 
whether from functional flexibility to the use of new technologies or vice-versa. Although 
studies abound, no consensus exists regarding the relationship between the two variables. For 
some agents the relationship is direct: the greater the flexibility, the greater the ability to 
introduce technology (European Commission, 2005). For other analysts, however, excess 
internal flexibility diminishes the company's ability to innovate in the long term (Franceschi and 
Mariani, 2016; Wachsen and Blind, 2016). On the other hand, other studies draw a link between 
introducing technology and internal flexibility. Here, there is a consensus that the introduction 
of new technologies favors internal flexibility (Treu, 1992; Love, Simpson, and Walker, 1989). 
Table 2. Percentage of establishment that use IFF by type, country, and change in IFF since 2010  
 
Work Team Multi Work Team Multi-Task 
Change IFF since 
2010 
Germany 79.5 35.7 64.1 20.7 
Spain 81.3 54.0 68.4 42.0 
France 78.6 40.4 68.7 28.9 
Italy 72.6 58.2 60.7 34.8 
UK 75.4 38.2 72.4 26.6 
Source: Prepared by the authors based on ECS2013. 
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5.2 Internal numerical flexibility (INF) 
The analysis of the changes in INF since 2010 reveals that Spanish establishments have 
introduced the most changes, followed by Italy and the UK. Germany, on the other hand, has 
changed the least in numerical flexibility. Despite this, the percentage of Spanish and Italian 
establishments using numerical flexibility mechanisms such as bank hours and part-time jobs is 
still lower than in Germany, France, and the UK. The latter result is mainly related to the low 
incidence of INF mechanisms before 2010 and that the GR forced to introduce them faster. The 
most important changes introduced by these countries are the Temporary Employment 
Regulations (EREs) in Spain and the Cassa Integrazione in Italy, although these changes were 
introduced before 2010. The changes come in addition to an increased use of flexible forms 
such as bank hours, part-time contracts, and temporary work agencies.  
Regarding the economic situation, the establishments that posted the greatest loss of 
employment and production and felt their financial situation worsen made the most changes in 
the organization of working time, however, is important to note that it doesn’t mean causality 
(Annex 4). Otherwise, establishments in Germany within the three sectors of activity 
experienced less intense negative consequences of the crisis in terms of employment, 
production, and finances, and made less frequent changes in work organization. Spain recorded 
an opposite situation. France and the UK are closer to the German situation. In the industrial and 
financial services sectors, the relationship between these two variables in Italian establishments 
shows a behavior close to that of the UK and France. Only the commerce and hospitality sector 
in Spain and Italy have an equivalent situation. This relation between INF and the GR is the 
same outcome found previously in the case of IFF. 
With respect to the relationship between changes in INF and the introduction of new 
technology, there is a positive correlation with each of the three economic sectors considered, 
although with a certain heterogeneity between countries and sectors. Among sectors, the 
correlation is higher for commerce and hospitality, and financial services have a higher 
correlation than the industrial sector. In this latter sector, establishments in Spain and the UK 
have introduced proportionally more changes in the use of technology. In the commerce and 
hospitality sector, it is the case in Spain and Italy. In the financial sector, we found a higher 
level of correlation between INF and the changes in use of new technology in the UK. 
There is no clear relationship between union-bargaining power and the percentage of 
establishments that introduced changes in INF. In Germany and France, for example, the 
frequency of changes in INF indicates a direct relationship with the degree of centralization of 
collective bargaining; in the other countries, however, there is no clear relationship. 
Table 3. Internal Numerical Flexibility by type, country, and change since 2010 (% of establishment) 
 
Working Time Bank Hour Part Time Change INF 
Germany 71.4 92.9 79.1 12.6 
Spain 74.5 49.3 57.3 30.6 
France 72.5 76.3 64.2 17.6 
Italy 68.2 55.1 64.1 20.8 
UK 72.1 58.8 76.8 19.4 
Source: Prepared by the authors based on ECS2013. 
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5.3 Salary or financial flexibility (SF) 
The analysis of descriptive statistics regarding SF shows some heterogeneity by sectors and 
countries. The most used forms are flexible payments linked to the individual performance, 
followed by extra pay linked to the results of the establishment and linked to the performance of 
the team, working group or department. With regard to the financial participation of the 
company, the most used form is based on profits, followed by extra pay in form of share 
ownership scheme offered by the company. 
All countries show the SF described above, but Italy applies all types of wage flexibility less 
frequently (except for extra payments for workgroup performance, where we detect a lower 
percentage among Spanish establishments.) France and the UK have a higher relative incidence 
of wage flexibility for financial participation. 
Changes in SF show that Spain has introduced changes more frequently since 2010, for the 
total economy, and in commerce and hospitality, and the financial services sectors. The UK 
places second, but first in the industrial sector; Italy and Germany follow with similar results: 
Italy leads in the financial-services sector and Germany in the commerce and hospitality sector. 
France introduced the least changes in SF since 2010. We observe that the greater the size of the 
company, the greater SF in all countries, by sector and type of SF. 
Regarding the establishment size, there is a clear tendency for the frequency of different 
types of SF to increase with the size of the establishment, in all countries, sectors, and types of 
flexibility. France is an exception: smaller establishments have introduced the most changes, 
followed by medium and large ones. 
Variables related to the economic situation apparently show a low level of relationship with 
changes in SF in establishments of all five countries and in the three sectors (Annex 5). Perhaps 
only in the financial-services sector is the relationship somewhat stronger, revealing a certain 
positive correlation between those establishments/companies that have suffered the most from 
the crisis and the introduction of changes in SF, without revealing causality. 
All the three sectors show a positive relationship between changes in SF and changes in the 
use of technology. 
The relationship between SF and the wage-bargaining level is not homogeneous in countries 
and sectors. Current empirical literature suggests that there is no compatible relationship 
because the more bargaining is centralized, the lower the degree of wage flexibility (Calmfors 
and Driffill, 1988). Moreover, the same theoretical relation would be expected with regard to 
the changes introduced in SF, that is, the greater worker resistance is to changes in the payment 
system, the greater their bargaining power. Thus, we would expect that the change in SF is 
negatively related to the collective-bargaining level.  
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Table 4. SF by type, country, and change since 2010 (% of establishment) 
 
Results 
Individual 
performance 
Performance of 
the team 
Profit share 
scheme 
Share 
ownership Change SF 
Germany 34.9 50.9 23.8 38.7 5.1 24.5 
Spain 41.5 43.5 30.0 31.9 7.7 31.1 
France 42.1 45.8 31.1 49.1 10.9 17.1 
Italy 22.5 44.5 26.6 30.3 4.3 22.5 
UK 38.9 46.8 30.7 32.5 11.8 23.7 
Source: Prepared by the authors based on ECS2013. 
5.4 The probit model of IF determination 
The previous analyses do not produce definitive results regarding the main determinants of 
changes in the internal flexibility of the countries and sectors. Therefore, a probit model com-
plements the study to estimate the main determinants of changes in the three different types of 
internal flexibility at the company level in the five countries. We estimated one model for the 
EU15 and five for the countries considered.  
In all models, the introduction of new technology is the most important determinant of 
changes in the three types of internal flexibility in the EU15 countries. The establishment size is 
only statistically significant for the probability of changes in INF and SF. Large establishments 
are relatively more important in terms of the probability of changes in INF, while mid-sized 
establishments are relatively more important regarding the probability of changes in SF. 
The economic-cycle variable, represented by employment, is used as a reference to keep the 
number of workers constant. It is statistically significant in the three types of internal flexibility. 
Since the variables that show increases and decreases in the number of employees are 
statistically significant, this would imply that establishments that maintained a constant number 
of workers are less likely to introduce changes in the different types of internal flexibility than 
those establishments that posted both positive and negative variations in the number of 
employees. 
In terms of the wage-bargaining level, there is some heterogeneity in the determination of 
internal flexibility. In the case of IFF and SF, only wage bargaining at the establishment/com-
pany and national levels is statistically significant, while the sectoral/regional level is not. In the 
case of INF, all wage-bargaining levels are statistically significant, although we see that the 
weight of wage bargaining at the sectoral/regional level is slightly lower than the other two. In 
all cases, wage bargaining at the occupational level, used as a reference in the models, appears 
with a lower weight than the other areas in determining the probability of changes in the 
different types of internal flexibility. 
Finally, there is also a high degree of heterogeneity in the economic sectors. In IFF, only the 
construction sector is statistically significant; for INF, only the construction, commerce and 
hospitality sectors are significant; and in SF, the commerce and hospitality, transport, 
communications, financial services, and other services are statistically significant. The con-
struction sector reduces the probability of changes in both the INF and IFF for the industrial 
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sector, which is the reference for the estimations; the other statistically significant sectors have a 
slightly higher probability of change than the industrial sector. 
The main results of the analysis for the five countries estimations are: 
Changes in the use of technology are the main determinant of changes in the three types of 
internal flexibility for all countries. The most important changes take place in IFF, then in 
payment systems and, finally, in INF.  
In terms of the establishment size, there is considerable heterogeneity between countries. In 
Spain and UK, the establishment size accounts for changes in internal flexibility, while in 
contrast, it is not important in Germany and France. In Italy, only medium-sized establishments 
are statistically significant. 
The economic situation has positive effects on the likelihood of change in all types of 
estimated flexibility. There are some exceptions, but in general, changes in employment, 
regardless of its sign, increase the probability of introducing changes in internal flexibility. This 
result could be associated with the need for adjustment resulting from the change in the number 
of workers employed in the establishment, that is, a change in the number of employees brings 
with it the need for changes in the internal flexibility of companies. 
This result raises two issues: First, the direction of causality, i.e., whether from flexibility to 
changes in the volume of employment or vice-versa. Second, the effects of flexibility on 
employment. We undertook these analyses based on the PECs hypothesis (Freyssinet and 
Seifert, 2001; Sisson and Martín Artiles, 2000). This implies an effort to preserve employment 
or minimize job losses in exchange for decreasing production costs and improved adaptation to 
changes in market conditions. Seen this way, the relationship should be nonexistent, once 
changes in flexibility guarantee the volume of employment. Yet, without accounting for job 
quality (once more-flexible forms of work are introduced, such as temporary or part-time 
contracts, and lead to a decrease in the quality of employment), some studies associate the 
introduction of internal flexibility to reduced unemployment, while other studies point to the 
increase in long-term unemployment. In any event, the matter requires much more microecon-
omic and qualitative research to determine the direction of causality. 
Regarding the wage-bargaining level in Spain, Italy, and France, we found a small 
relationship with internal flexibility, with a few exceptions: In Spain, wage bargaining at the 
sectoral/regional level reduces IFF; however, it increases SF at the establishment level. In Italy, 
wage bargaining at the national level increases the probability of changes in the INF and SF. In 
Germany, the wage-bargaining level seems to have more effect on IFF and SF, and there was no 
relationship with INF. In the UK, bargaining wage at the national level increases the likelihood 
of changes in all types of internal flexibility; however, bargaining at the sectoral/regional level 
increases the rigidity in INF. 
In terms of the economic sectors, we also found no homogeneous relationship among 
countries in the different models. In Spain, the commerce and hospitality sector and the 
financial services sector have a greater probability of changes in internal flexibility; in 
Germany, this is the case of the industrial sector. There are no significant differences between 
sectors of economic activity in Italy and the UK. In France, the results are contradictory, 
because belonging to the financial-services sector increases the probability of changes in SF, but 
reduces the probability of changes in INF. 
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6 Conclusions 
This study aimed to analyze the effects of the GR on the internal flexibility of the EU countries, 
focusing the analysis on five countries (Spain, Germany, France, Italy, and the UK) and three 
sectors of economic activity (industry, tourism, and bank). The descriptive statistics analysis 
shows that the level and the intensity of internal flexibility changes since 2010 were 
heterogeneous between countries and sectors. These changes are related to the existed degree of 
internal flexibility before the GR. Therefore, Spain and Italy made the most changes in internal 
flexibility since 2010. This response is more intense in medium and large establishments. By 
sector of activity, changes have been more frequent in German industrial establishments; in the 
Spanish and French commerce and hospitality sectors; and in the Italian and UK financial 
sectors. We found, moreover, the response was more intensive in terms of IFF, which is a new 
evidence in the industrial relations literature. The probit model estimations confirm that two 
variables, the economic situation and the introduction of new technologies, were the main 
determinants of changes in internal flexibility, with greater intensity in IFF, followed by SF and 
then INF.  
These results, in general, while requiring a more detailed analysis of the effects of the GR 
on the internal flexibility of the EU countries, contribute with several novel results to the 
literature. First, the process of adapting to the economic situation, while showing a certain 
convergence to greater internal flexibility, is not homogeneous among countries and sectors of 
activity within countries, despite the findings showed by Glassner et al. (2011) and Carley and 
Marginson (2011). Thus, the study of effects must consider not only regional labor market 
institutions differences but also sectoral ones. The evidence on the effects of the intensity of the 
crisis and the productive and technological characteristics of each sector seems to point in this 
direction.  
Moreover, the conclusions also show that the wage bargaining level has little effect on 
adjustments to the economic situation in terms of internal flexibility. This could be evidence in 
favor of the perspective that the process of adjustment of collective bargaining to the business 
cycle is a distributive bargaining type, particularly in Spain and Italy. Therefore, using Traxler 
(1995), we could associate the German case to an “organized decentralization” leading by the 
social partners, however, the Spanish and Italian case follow a “disorganized decentralization”, 
imposed by the government in Spain and driven by the firm in Italy. 
Although these findings contribute to the understanding of the EU15 industrial relations 
change during the GR, they are limited by the database characteristics (ECS2013) and the 
quantitative analysis. Regarding the database, and taking into account the paper objective, the 
effects of GR on industrial relations, particularly those related to the consequences of GR and 
the financial imbalance at company level. On the other side, the empirical analysis throughout a 
qualitative methodology, would offer complementary evidences about effective answer of the 
employees and the employer, through the collective bargaining, to the GR; capturing, moreover, 
the sectoral heterogeneity. In this sense, future research would focus on the relationship between 
company finance situation and industrial relations, since a theoretical and empirical perspective. 
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Annex 1: Sample by sector and country 
 
Industry 
Commerce and 
Hospitality 
Financial services and 
real state 
Germany 623 286 39 
Spain 432 300 49 
France 379 399 80 
Italy 659 288 42 
UK 300 495 75 
Source: Prepared by the authors based on ECS2013 
Annex 2. Cross-correlation Coefficient among the Functional, Numerical,  
and Wage Internal Flexibility (EU15) Variables 
 Functional Numerical Wage 
Functional 1.0000   
Numeric 0.2967 1.0000  
Wage 0.2499 0.2252 1.0000 
Source: Prepared by the authors based on ECS2013. 
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Annex 3. IFF change since 2010 by sectors, economic situation variables, wage bargaining level and countries (% establishment) 
 
 
Changes IFF Changes (reducing) Worsening 
Finance 
Change in 
use of 
technology 
                   Wage Bargaining level 
 
 
Total Sector Employment Production National Sector/Regional Establishment 
Industry Germany 20.7 20.8 14.8 9.4 13.8 71.7 11.4 39.2 28.2 
Spain 42.0 36.9 50.9 32.7 43.8 74.2 26.7 45.1 49 
France 28.9 26.6 23.2 12.6 31.6 58.6 30.4 47.9 65.7 
Italy 34.8 33.7 37.3 28 31.4 78.2 79.2 19.7 34.8 
UK 26.6 31.4 27.8 17.7 19.3 82.5 10.6 14 44.2 
Commerce 
and 
Hospitality 
Germany 20.7 17.0 12.5 0 10.9 72.9 13.3 45.8 37.5 
Spain 42.0 46.6 50 32.9 48.6 71.5 23.9 71.4 30.5 
France 28.9 31.4 24.4 11.9 23.3 57.7 28.2 33.9 40.5 
Italy 34.8 34.3 27.3 30.4 44.4 73.7 83.5 13.7 8.2 
UK 26.6 25.2 15.3 7.3 10 71.9 19.8 12.8 41.5 
Finance Germany 20.7 17.8 0 0 8.3 61.5 15.4 38.5 23.1 
Spain 42.0 39.3 50 25 59.1 72.7 42.9 54.5 18.2 
France 28.9 30.0 8.3 0 12.5 66.7 20.8 47.8 75 
Italy 34.8 44.4 35 16.7 30 85 70 50 30 
UK 26.6 33.8 40.7 0 25.9 70.4 13 12.5 40 
Source: Prepared by the authors based on ECS2013 
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Annex 4. INF change since 2010 by sectors. economic situation variables. wage bargaining level and countries (% establishment)  
 
 
Changes INF Changes (reducing) Worsening Change in use of 
technology 
                    Wage Bargaining level 
 
 
Total Sector Employment Production Finance National Sector/Regional Establishment 
Industry Germany 12.6 14.2 25 17.6 17.9 59.8 6 47.1 35.6 
Spain 30.6 24.2 43.8 39.2 46.9 63.6 32.7 53 44.6 
France 17.6 15.8 27.6 19 24.6 50 30.4 45.6 67.2 
Italy 20.8 17.2 49.5 31.1 41.3 61.5 81.3 24.5 40.6 
UK 19.4 18.6 24.6 10.5 15.4 79.8 11.5 9.3 46.2 
Commerce 
and 
Hospitality 
Germany 12.6 14.5 12.2 2.6 15.4 70.7 12.8 48.8 39 
Spain 30.6 30.0 37.8 37 55.6 70.7 24.4 71.1 27.5 
France 17.6 24.3 26 10.9 18.1 56.3 31.9 42.6 41.1 
Italy 20.8 29.8 32.6 40.3 48.2 57 84.7 14.5 14.1 
UK 19.4 20.5 11.5 4.4 8.5 66.3 19.3 11.2 48.3 
Finance Germany 12.6 2.5 0 0 25 100 0 75 25 
Spain 30.6 31.6 50 58.8 70.6 61.1 44.4 66.7 16.7 
France 17.6 7.3 33.3 16.7 16.7 83.3 20 75 83.3 
Italy 20.8 20.0 44.4 12.5 44.4 100 66.7 33.3 55.6 
UK 19.4 23.5 26.3 0 21.1 68.4 16.7 11.1 44.4 
Source: Prepared by the authors based on ECS2013 
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Annex 5. SF change since 2010 by sectors. economic situation variables. wage bargaining level and countries (% establishment) 
 
 
Changes SF Changes (reducing) Worsening Change in use of 
technology 
                 Wage Bargaining level 
 
 
Total Sector Employment Production Finance National Sector/Regional Establishment 
Industry Germany 24.5 22.3 12.3 7.3 12.4 66.9 6 44 48.5 
Spain 31.1 25.5 50.9 37.5 51.9 67.9 28.6 59.4 46.2 
France 17.1 13.6 20 12.2 26 56 26.1 39.6 63.3 
Italy 22.5 21.8 34.8 27.7 38.5 67.2 81.5 20 35.6 
UK 23.7 26.7 23.5 10.1 12.3 79 13.5 12.2 45.9 
Commerce 
and 
Hospitality 
Germany 24.5 26.1 14.9 4.5 20.8 67.1 8.5 56.2 43.8 
Spain 31.1 28.0 50 40.7 54.8 73.3 24.1 61.4 32.1 
France 17.1 19.3 30.3 14.7 31.1 59.2 32.9 33.8 43.2 
Italy 22.5 19.2 30.9 40.4 53.7 74.5 83.3 13 13 
UK 23.7 23.5 13.8 7.8 11.5 72.5 17.2 10.3 38.1 
Finance Germany 24.5 13.7 10 0 30 80 20 80 60 
Spain 31.1 38.6 50 33.3 61.9 63.9 38.1 59.1 31.8 
France 17.1 27.2 13.6 4.5 18.2 63.6 36.4 40.9 86.4 
Italy 22.5 31.1 42.9 0 30.8 100 78.6 28.6 35.7 
UK 23.7 26.3 42.6 0 14.3 61.9 26.3 15 40 
Source: Prepared by the authors based on ECS2013 
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Annex 6: Internal flexibility determination models 
Model 1: UE-15 
 (1) 
IFF 1 
(2) 
IFF 2 
(3) 
IFN1 
(4) 
IFN 2 
(5) 
SF 1 
(6) 
SF 2 
 
TECHNOLOGY 0.353*  0.166*  0.223*  
 (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01)  
NECOEMPRESA 0.018** 0.040* 0.039* 0.043* 0.062* 0.071* 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
NECOSECTOR 0.003 0.013 0.022* 0.024* -0.006 -0.001 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
NECONACIONAL 0.023** 0.036* 0.040* 0.045* 0.014*** 0.022* 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Employment =increase 0.092* 0.128* 0.042* 0.060* 0.065* 0.089* 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Employment 
=decrease 
0.086* 0.090* 0.073* 0.075* 0.062* 0.066* 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Construction -0.022 -0.033** -0.041* -0.036* 0.023 0.021 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Commerce and 
hospitality 
0.008 0.004 0.031* 0.039* 0.018*** 0.022** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Transport and 
communication 
0.005 0.005 0.011 0.015 0.036** 0.038** 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) 
Financial services and 
real estate 
0.011 0.024 -0.018 -0.012 0.040** 0.048* 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Other services 0.005 0.015 -0.012 -0.003 0.026* 0.034* 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Denmark 0.070* 0.128* 0.023 0.050** 0.011 0.049** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Germany -0.169* -0.161* -0.051* -0.057* 0.050** 0.042** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Ireland -0.063** -0.029 0.023 0.036 0.073* 0.090* 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Greece 0.162* 0.168* 0.120* 0.134* 0.110* 0.122* 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Spain 0.004 0.040*** 0.100* 0.114* 0.071* 0.091* 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
France -0.049** -0.090* 0.005 -0.017 -0.040** -0.067* 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
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Italy -0.058* -0.036*** 0.006 0.012 -0.005 0.004 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Luxembourg 0.010 -0.002 0.054** 0.049*** -0.040 -0.047*** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) 
Netherlands 0.048** 0.058** 0.048** 0.049** 0.006 0.010 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Austria 0.008 0.042*** 0.090* 0.100* 0.073* 0.093* 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Portugal 0.035 0.102* 0.008 0.042** 0.209* 0.252* 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Finland 0.104* 0.158* 0.102* 0.133* 0.057* 0.096* 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Sweden 0.192* 0.229* 0.038*** 0.063* 0.016 0.051** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
UK -0.133* -0.109* 0.013 0.017 0.009 0.016 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Medium Size  0.012  0.030*  0.030* 
  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
Large Size  -0.009  0.047*  0.022** 
  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
Constant * * * * * * 
       
Pseudo - R2 0.1457 0.0535 0.0663 0.0327 0.0827 0.0306 
N. 15977 15977 16027 16027 15944 15944 
Chi2 3131.66 1149.89 1149.40 567.91 1535.44 568.94 
Prob>Chi2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Standard deviation in bracket. *** p<0.10. ** p<0.05. * p<0.01 
Source: Prepared by the authors based on ECS2013 
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Models by Countries: Model 2: SPAIN 
 (1) 
IFF 1 
(2) 
IFF 2 
(3) 
IFN1 
(4) 
IFN 2 
(5) 
SF 1 
(6) 
SF 2 
 
TECHNOLOGY 0.378*  0.174*  0.221*  
 (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)  
NECOEMPRESA 0.007 0.034 0.021 0.020 0.063** 0.071** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
NECOSECTOR -0.063** -0.055*** 0.004 0.006 0.023 0.022 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
NECONACIONAL 0.002 -0.007 -0.013 -0.015 -0.004 -0.008 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Employment =increase 0.092** 0.124* 0.011 0.023 0.106* 0.125* 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) 
Employment 
=decrease 
0.031 0.023 0.069** 0.062** 0.110* 0.100* 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Construction 0.037 0.051 0.015 0.042 0.116** 0.136** 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) 
Commerce and 
hospitality 
0.098** 0.114* 0.040 0.066*** 0.044 0.068*** 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Transport and 
communication 
-0.015 0.047 0.041 0.084 0.039 0.089 
(0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
Financial services and 
real estate 
-0.034 0.018 0.006 0.026 0.140*** 0.165** 
 (0.08) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) 
Other services 0.037 0.069** 0.124* 0.142* 0.103* 0.124* 
 (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Medium Size  0.020  0.065**  0.048*** 
  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03) 
Large Size  0.018  0.103*  0.065*** 
  (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.04) 
Constant * * * * * * 
       
Pseudo - R2 0.1223 0.0143 0.0441 0.0216 0.0707 0.0274 
N. 1416 1416 1422 1422 1414 1414 
Chi2 235.61 27.61 77.24 37.83 123.82 47.99 
Prob>Chi2 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Standard deviation in bracket. *** p<0.10. ** p<0.05. * p<0.01 
Source: Prepared by the authors based on ECS2013 
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Model 3: GERMANY 
 (1) 
IFF 1 
(2) 
IFF 2 
(3) 
IFN1 
(4) 
IFN 2 
(5) 
SF 1 
(6) 
SF 2 
 
TECHNOLOGY 0.283*  0.123*  0.270*  
 (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)  
NECOEMPRESA -0.063* -0.052** -0.004 0.002 0.083* 0.096* 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
NECOSECTOR 0.030 0.048** 0.050* 0.053* 0.095* 0.108* 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
NECONACIONAL 0.038 0.062*** 0.029 0.033 -0.011 0.006 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) 
Employment =increase 0.055** 0.098* 0.055* 0.064* 0.063** 0.093* 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) 
Employment 
=decrease 
0.057 0.083** 0.115* 0.118* 0.048 0.059 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Construction 0.027 0.002 -0.055** -0.043 -0.023 -0.029 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) 
Commerce and 
hospitality 
-0.033 -0.051*** 0.003 0.012 0.031 0.014 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) 
Transport and 
communication 
0.037 0.021 -0.033 -0.031 0.100** 0.083*** 
(0.05) (0.05) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05) 
Financial services and 
real estate 
-0.075 -0.074 -0.083*** -0.088*** -0.115*** -0.122*** 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.02) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05) 
Other services -0.001 -0.003 -0.039*** -0.033 0.026 0.021 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) 
Medium Size  -0.019  0.033  0.031 
  (0.03)  (0.02)  (0.03) 
Large Size  -0.043  0.042***  -0.036 
  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03) 
Constant * * * * * * 
       
Pseudo - R2 0.1323 0.0230 0.0842 0.0436 0.1176 0.0384 
N. 1448 1448 1453 1453 1451 1451 
Chi2 195.83 34.01 92.66 47.95 190.19 62.06 
Prob>Chi2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Standard deviation in bracket. *** p<0.10. ** p<0.05. * p<0.01 
Source: Prepared by the authors based on ECS2013 
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Model 4: FRANCE 
 (1) 
IFF 1 
(2) 
IFF 2 
(3) 
IFN1 
(4) 
IFN 2 
(5) 
SF 1 
(6) 
SF 2 
 
TECHNOLOGY 0.372*  0.227*  0.207*  
 (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.02)  
NECOEMPRESA -0.051*** -0.023 -0.010 -0.009 -0.010 0.004 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
NECOSECTOR -0.006 -0.006 0.028 0.026 -0.024 -0.024 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
NECONACIONAL 0.007 0.036 0.019 0.036 0.001 0.019 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Employment =increase 0.093* 0.137* 0.024 0.054** 0.029 0.059* 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Employment 
=decrease 
0.092* 0.090* 0.102* 0.105* 0.057** 0.059** 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Construction -0.024 -0.020 -0.006 0.005 0.058 0.061 
 (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Commerce and 
hospitality 
0.044 0.044 0.082* 0.092* 0.060** 0.062** 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Transport and 
communication 
0.041 0.030 0.033 0.033 0.069 0.065 
(0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) 
Financial services and 
real estate 
0.030 0.061 -0.097** -0.081*** 0.150* 0.173* 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.03) (0.04) (0.06) (0.06) 
Other services 0.055 0.050 -0.005 -0.003 0.023 0.023 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Medium Size  -0.027  0.012  -0.016 
  (0.03)  (0.02)  (0.02) 
Large Size  -0.045  -0.005  -0.033 
  (0.04)  (0.03)  (0.03) 
Constant * * * * * * 
       
Pseudo - R2 0.1311 0.0218 0.1049 0.0308 0.0826 0.0194 
N. 1424 1424 1423 1423 1421 1421 
Chi2 224.83 37.38 138.49 40.71 107.15 25.17 
Prob>Chi2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 
Standard deviation in bracket. *** p<0.10. ** p<0.05. * p<0.01 
Source: Prepared by the authors based on ECS2013 
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Model 5: ITALY 
 (1) 
IFF 1 
(2) 
IFF 2 
(3) 
IFN1 
(4) 
IFN 2 
(5) 
SF 1 
(6) 
SF 2 
 
TECHNOLOGY 0.392*  0.131*  0.177*  
 (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)  
NECOEMPRESA 0.013 0.036 0.068* 0.061** 0.057** 0.051*** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
NECOSECTOR -0.037 -0.001 0.041 0.051 0.010 0.025 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
NECONACIONAL 0.006 0.009 0.048*** 0.048*** 0.054*** 0.053*** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Employment =increase 0.086* 0.133* 0.056** 0.071** 0.067** 0.086* 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Employment 
=decrease 
0.031 0.036 0.095* 0.098* 0.038 0.041 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Construction -0.004 -0.003 0.007 0.017 -0.034 -0.028 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Commerce and 
hospitality 
0.002 0.021 0.150* 0.165* -0.032 -0.015 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Transport and 
communication 
0.011 -0.012 0.045 0.041 0.014 -0.000 
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) 
Financial services and 
real estate 
0.036 0.109 -0.028 0.000 0.023 0.065 
 (0.08) (0.08) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
Other services 0.060*** 0.063*** 0.050*** 0.054*** 0.020 0.023 
 (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Medium Size  0.057***  0.066**  0.060** 
  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03) 
Large Size  0.004  0.039  0.053 
  (0.04)  (0.03)  (0.03) 
Constant * * * * * * 
       
Pseudo - R2 0.1459 0.0177 0.0585 0.0377 0.0594 0.0217 
N. 1503 1503 1512 1512 1505 1505 
Chi2 283.50 34.38 90.65 58.46 95.25 34.82 
Prob>Chi2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Standard deviation in bracket. *** p<0.10. ** p<0.05. * p<0.01 
Source: Prepared by the authors based on ECS2013 
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Model 6: UNITED KINGDOM 
 (1) 
IFF 1 
(2) 
IFF 2 
(3) 
IFN1 
(4) 
IFN 2 
(5) 
SF 1 
(6) 
SF 2 
 
TECHNOLOGY 0.309*  0.198*  0.266*  
 (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02)  
NECOEMPRESA 0.004 -0.004 0.048** 0.040*** 0.014 0.004 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
NECOSECTOR 0.030 0.038 -0.054*** -0.051 0.026 0.031 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) 
NECONACIONAL 0.071*** 0.107* 0.115* 0.146* 0.095** 0.123* 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Employment =increase 0.049*** 0.086* 0.035 0.065* 0.069* 0.100* 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) 
Employment 
=decrease 
0.099* 0.137* 0.011 0.042 0.044 0.080** 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) 
Construction -0.008 -0.032 -0.025 -0.039 -0.024 -0.041 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
Commerce and 
hospitality 
-0.017 -0.023 0.036 0.032 -0.015 -0.005 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Transport and 
communication 
-0.016 -0.028 -0.001 -0.008 0.002 -0.007 
(0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) 
Financial services and 
real estate 
0.046 0.004 0.052 0.027 0.014 -0.012 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
Other services -0.054 -0.060*** -0.001 -0.005 -0.071** -0.072** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Medium Size  0.071*  0.034  0.110* 
  (0.03)  (0.02)  (0.03) 
Large Size  0.083**  0.065**  0.112* 
  (0.04)  (0.03)  (0.04) 
Constant * * * * * * 
       
Pseudo - R2 0.1274 0.0282 0.0838 0.0241 0.1135 0.0388 
N. 1435 1435 1441 1441 1397 1397 
Chi2 211.67 46.83 118.02 33.92 173.84 59.50 
Prob>Chi2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Standard deviation in bracket. *** p<0.10. ** p<0.05. * p<0.01 
Source: Prepared by the authors based on ECS2013 
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